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Constitutionalization and the Unity of the Law of
International Responsibility
ANDRf NOLLKAEMPER*
ABSTRACT
The law of international responsibility fulfills essentially two functions: reparation
for injury and protection of the rule of law and global order. Notwithstanding the funda-
mental difference between these objectives, the law of international responsibility tradi-
tionally has been conceived in unitary norms consisting of a single set of principles that
applies to all breaches of rules of international law. With the further development of in-
ternational law that unity becomes difficult to maintain. On the one hand, there is an
increasing need for a further refinement of liability principles for the determination of
compensation for injury. On the other hand, the process of constitutionalization of inter-
national law poses entirely different accountability requirements to which the law of in-
ternational responsibility should contribute. Maintaining unity may leadto inconsistencies
and hinder the refinement of the law of international responsibility that is necessary to
deal with the various types of responsibility and accountability issues of modern interna-
tional law, thereby marginalizing the law of responsibility.
INTRODUCTION
This article will discuss the consequences that the process of constitutionaliza-
tion may have on the unity of the law regarding international responsibility of states
or international organizations. In view of its emerging constitutional dimensions,
can the law of international responsibility maintain its traditional unity as a single
set of principles that applies to all breaches of the rules of international law? The
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term "constitutionalization" will be discussed below, but it can be defined briefly as
the emergence of constitutional aspects in international law that concern the organi-
zation of the international legal order.'
Traditionally, the law of international responsibility has been based on a uni-
tary notion of responsibility. Its prime function was to repair injury caused to a
person (primarily a state) whose subjective rights were infringed. It did not distin-
guish between private and public wrongs, but rather was depicted as sui generis,
having both private and public dimensions.2 In contrast, developed domestic legal
orders distinguish between private and public wrongs3 and thus do not employ a
unitary conception of responsibility. Moreover, they provide the institutional condi-
tions to make such a distinction meaningful.
Though it lacks the differentiation and refinement of many domestic legal
orders, the law of the European Union (EU) shows that such distinctions are not
confined to domestic law. The principles of liability for non-contractual damage
caused by EU institutions are based on a tort model.' Few would say that these are
mechanisms for protecting the public order. EU law has a set of relatively devel-
oped principles underlying infringement procedures, which are designed to de-
termine non-compliance with obligations vis-A-vis the EU itself, and in that
respect, maintain a public order.5 These procedures have little to do with address-
ing direct injury of other member states. EU law also has a body of principles
concerning political responsibility.6
In modern international law, there are several instances where the law of inter-
national responsibility has functioned in a public or constitutional capacity, rather
1. Anne Peters, Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental
International Norms and Structures, 19 LEIDEN J. INT'L L. 579, 582 (2006).
2. James Crawford & Simon Olleson, The Nature and Forms of International Responsibility, in
INTERNATIONAL LAW 445, 451 (M. Evans ed., 2003).
3. These concepts relate to the distinction between private and public law. For a discussion of
this distinction, see HARTMUT MAURER, ALLGEMEINES VERWALTUNGSRECHT 48-51 (2006).
4. Consolidated Version of the Treaty Establishing the European Community art. 228, Sept. 5,
2008, 2008 O.J. (Cl15) 1 [hereinafter EC Treaty], available at http://eur-lex.europa.eu/en/treaties/
dat/12002E/pdf/12002EEN.pdf (stating that "[iun the case of non-contractual liability, the Com-
munity shall, in accordance with the general principles common to the laws of the Member States,
make good any damage caused by its institutions or by its servants in the performance of their du-
ties."). For a discussion of the relevant principles, see NON-CONTRACTUAL LIABILITY OF THE EURO-
PEAN COMMUNITIES (Henry G. Schermers et al. eds., 1988).
5. EC Treaty art. 226. See generally ANTHONY ARNULL, THE EUROPEAN UNION AND ITS COURT
OF JUSTICE 34, 34-52 (2006).
6. Mark Bovens, New Forms of Accountability and EU-Governance, 5 CoMp. EUR. POL. 104, 114
(2007).
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than solely for the purpose of compensation for damage. For example, the case law
of the European Court on Human Rights (ECtHR) has traditionally been premised
on the requirement that legal injury was caused to a person, who thereby could
qualify as a victim.7 In recent case law, the ECtHR formulated remedies that are not
contingent on individual injury, and ordered states to overhaul legislation that, in
general, was deemed to be incompatible with the European Convention on Human
Rights (Convention).' In the Genocide case, the International Court of Justice (ICJ)
was confronted with the fact that genocide was not only an alleged wrong against
Bosnia and Herzegovina, but that "the norm prohibiting genocide was assuredly a
peremptory norm of international law (jus cogens)."9 The International Law Com-
mission (ILC) is currently transposing the principles of responsibility of states to the
responsibility of international organizations, which in many respects concerns the
allocation of powers, rather than providing reparation for injury."
The law of international responsibility of states is contained in one document
that, with few exceptions, applies across the board to all breaches of all norms of
international law.'1 The Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Or-
ganizations are heading in the same direction. 2 The question is whether this ap-
proach leaves proper room for the variety of functions that the law of international
responsibility may need to fulfill. Can the law of international responsibility, as a
unitary set of principles, serve both the traditional function of reparation for in-
jury, and more constitutional functions that appear from the example given
7. Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms as Amended
by Protocol No. 11, art. 34, Nov. 1, 1998, Europ. T.S. No. 155 [hereinafter ECHR].
8. See, e.g., Broniowski v. Poland, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2006); Sejdovic v. Italy, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R.
360 (2006); see also Valerio Colondrea, On the Power of the European Court of Human Rights to
Order Specific Non-monetary Measures: Some Remarks in the Light of the Assanidze, Broniowski and
Sejdovic Cases, 7 HuM. RTS. L. REv. 396, 410-11 (2007).
9. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide, (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 161 (Feb. 26, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf; see also Case Concerning the Application of
the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, (Bosnia and Herze-
govina v. Yugoslavia), 1996 I.C.J. (Preliminary Objections) 595, 31 (July 11).
10. The text of the articles (at the moment of writing) is contained in International Law Com-
mission [ILCI, Report of the ILC, Responsibility of International Organization, The Internation-
ally Wrongful Act ofan International Organization, 164, U.N. Doc. A/63/10 (Aug. 8, 2008).
11. The Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts [hereinafter
Articles on State Responsibility] are contained in the Annex of G.A. Res. 56/83, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/56/83 (Jan. 28, 2002).
12. The draft Articles generally follow the structure and main principles of the Articles on State
Responsibility. See, e.g., ILC, First Report on Responsibility of International Organizations, 35-
36, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/532 (Mar. 26,2003) (prepared by Special Rapporteur Giorgio Gaja).
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above? Is, for instance, the "responsibility" of an organization vis-a-vis its mem-
bers that flows from an ultra vires act similar to the same responsibility as it ap-
plies in interstate relationships?' 3 Or do we need to acknowledge that the former
is of a different, perhaps more public law nature, and that the unitary nature of
the law of international responsibility cannot be maintained?
Previously, the question of unity has, if at all, been discussed from the per-
spective of the possible introduction of the notion of "state crimes" into the law of
state responsibility. 4 While the use of criminal law for the interpretation and ap-
plication of the law of state responsibility does pose complex questions that are
relevant to the unity, 5 the debate on state crimes has, at least temporarily, been
put to rest. This article will, in principle, leave aside challenges that international
criminal law may pose to the unity of the law of international responsibility, and
instead focus on the possible impact of constitutionalization on the unity of the
law of international responsibility. The notions of state crimes and of constitution-
alization are to some extent related; the concept of serious breaches of peremptory
norms of international law can as much be seen as an alternative to the notion of
state crimes, as one element of the process of constitutionalization.1
6
The article will proceed as follows. First, Part I will briefly identify some key
aspects of the process of "constitutionalization" insofar as this process may be rel-
evant to the law of international responsibility. Part II will discuss the traditional
"reparation for injury" nature of the law of international responsibility. Part III
will identify constitutional elements in the law of international responsibility. Part
IV will discuss whether, in view of these elements, it still makes sense to talk of
the law of international responsibility as a unitary system.
13. See the doubts expressed on this point by the International Monetary Fund, in ILC, Respon-
sibility of International Organizations, Comments and Observations Receivedfrom International Orga-
nizations, 6-7, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/545 (June 25, 2004).
14. The best volumes on the topic remain INTERNATIONAL CRIMES OF STATE: A CRITICAL ANALY-
SIS OF THE ILC's DRAFT ARTICLE 19 ON STATE RESIONSIBILITY (J.H.H. Weiler et al. eds., 1989) and
NINA H.B. JORGENSEN, THE RESPONSIBILITY OF STATES FOR INTERNATIONAL CRIMES (2000).
15. Specific questions relating to the appropriateness of injecting criminal law notions into the
law of international responsibility are further left out of consideration. Critical questions have been
raised by the use of the criminal law concept of complicity in the International Court of Justice's
judgment in the Genocide case. See Antonio Cassese, On the Use of Criminal Law Notions in Deter-
mining Responsibility for Genocide, 5 J. INT'L. CRIM. JusT. 875, 879 (2007).
16. See infra Part IV.
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I. THE TERM "CONSTITUTIONALIZATION"
Although it remains contested whether it is possible or helpful to construe in-
ternational law in constitutional terms, international law displays characteristics that
can be associated with the term "constitutional law" in at least three respects that are
relevant for appreciating the nature of international responsibility. 7 They are part of
a process that can be described as constitutionalization, a term defined as "short-
hand for the emergence of constitutional law within a given legal order."'8
First, if one accepts that a key element of constitutional law is that it organizes
and regulates political activity and relationships in a given global polity,9 one need
not object to using the term "constitutional" with respect to international law. In
fact, several of the foundational principles of international law have a distinct consti-
tutional element in this respect. What else is the function of sovereign equality than
an allocation of legal power in the international legal order? The principle of su-
premacy of international law is another fundamental principle that fulfills a consti-
tutional function in the international legal order.2" International obligations to
protect human rights constrain state power and therefore fulfill constitutional func-
17. See, e.g., FRANCISCO ORRECO VICUNA, INTERNATIONAL DISPUTE SETTLEMENT IN AN EVOLVING
GLOBAL SOCIETY: CONSTITUTIONALIZATION, ACCESSIBILITY, PRIVATIZATION (2004); Erika de Wet, The
International Constitutional Order, 55 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 51 (2006); Bardo Fassbender, The Meaning of
International Constitutional Law, in TRANSNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONALISM: INTERNATIONAL AND EURO-
PEAN MODELS (Nicholas Tsagourias ed., 2007); Konrad Lachmayer, The International Constitutional
Approach: An Introduction to a New Perspective on Constitutional Challenges in a Globalizing World, 1
VIENNA J. ON INT'L CONST. L. 91 (2007); Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann,Justice in International Law? From
the "International Law Among States" to "International Integration Law" and "Constitutional Law", 6
GLOBAL CMTY. Y.B. INT'L L. JURISPRUDENCE 105 (2006); Christian Walter, Constitutionalizing (Inter)
national Governance-Possibilities for and Limits to the Development of an International Constitutional
Law, 44 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 170 (2001); Christian Walter, International Law in a Process of Constitu-
tionalization, in NEW PERSPECTIVES ON THE DIVIDE BETWEEN NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 191
(Janne Nijman & Andr6 Nollkaemper eds., 200 7);seealso Peters, supra note 1.
18. Peters,supra note 1, at 582;seealso de Wet,supra note 17, at 51 (referring to the constitution-
alization of the international legal order as "the process of (re-)organization and (re-)allocation of
competence among the subjects of the international legal order, which shapes the international
community, its value system and enforcement") (emphasis added).
19. See Peters, supra note 1, at 585.
20. Gerald Fitzmaurice, The General Principles of International Law Considered From the Stand-
point of the Rule of Law, in 92 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE: RECUEIL DES COURS
1957111,6 (1958).
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tions. In the law of international organizations, these constitutional elements, in the
sense of allocating and limiting power, are more obviously present. 2'
Second, constitutional law implies some form of control over illegality. This is
a key feature of the rule of law as one of the organizing principles of constitutional
government. 22 In a variety of somewhat unorganized ways, international law pro-
vides for control of illegality. This control ranges from practices of protest and
non-recognition, to non-compliance procedures in the framework of international
institutions ,23 to international courts and tribunals. As we will see below, this con-
trol also extends to the law of international responsibility.
Third, constitutional law is based on recognition of public interest norms that
protect the interest of the polity as a whole, rather than only the interests of indi-
vidual states.24 Though the degree to which this is the case may be overstated,25 in-
ternational law recognizes a distinction between bilateral interest norms and public
interest norms. This is seen most notably in the form of international human rights
norms and the more general categories of erga omnes and jus cogens. 26
In these admittedly narrow respects, we can say that international law dis-
plays certain constitutional elements. The term "constitutional" is not well-estab-
lished in any of these respects. To the extent that legal scholars have deemed it
useful to use such overarching concepts at all (rather than just dealing with the
21. It is thus no misnomer that the several treaties establishing international organizations carry
the name of "constitution." See, e.g., Constitution of the World Health Organization, July 22, 1946,
62 Stat. 2679, available at http://www.who.int/governance/eb/who-constitutionen.pdf; Constitu-
tion of the International Labour Organization, Treaty of Versailles, June 28, 1919, Part XIII, 49 Stat.
2713, available at http://training.itcilo.it/ils/foa/library/constitution/indexconsten.html. See gener-
ally TETSUO SATO, EVOLVING CONSTITUTIONS OF INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATIONS: A CRITICAL ANALY-
SIS OF THE INTERPRETATIVE FRAMEWORK OF THE CONSTITUENT INSTRUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
ORGANIZATIONS (1996) (providing a common example of the use of the term in scholarship on inter-
national organizations).
22. See Peters, supra note 1, at 601.
23. See generally MAKING TREATIES WORK: HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRONMENT AND ARMS CONTROL
(Geir Ulfstein et al. eds., 2007).
24. Peters, supra note 1, at 6 01; see also de Wet, supra note 17, at 57.
25. Cf PHILLIP BOBBITT, THE SHIELD OF ACHILLES: WAR, PEACE, AND THE COURSE OF HISTORY 364,
805 (2002).
26. See, e.g., CHRISTIAN TOMUSCHAT & JEAN-MARc THOUVENIN, THE FUNDAMENTAL RULES OF THE
INTERNATIONAL LEGAL ORDER (2005); Bruno Simma, From Bilateralism to Community Interest in Inter-
national Law, 250 ACADEMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE: RECUEIL DES COURS, at 217 (1994).
For the concept of erga omnes, see generally MAURIZIo RAGAZZi, THE CONCEPT OF INTERNATIONAL
OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES (1997) and M. Giorgio Gaja, Les Obligations et les Droits Erga Omnes en
Droit International, in 71 ANNUAIRE DE LINSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 81 (2006). On jus cogens,
see generally ALEXANDER ORAKHELASHVILI, PEREMPTORY NORMS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (2006).
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discrete issues of limits on power, control of illegality, and public interest norms),
much of the recent academic discourse proceeds in terms of administrative law27
or public law,28 rather than constitutional law. No undue weight should be given
to such distinctions. In the current stage of development, the international legal
order may be too primitive to make proper distinctions between public law, as a
general category, and administrative and constitutional law. As long as the term
"constitutional" is not used with the same meaning as at the domestic level, but
rather is shorthand for referring to certain organizational principles of interna-
tional law, one need not object to its use in the context of international law.
II. THE TRADITIONAL LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The traditional law of international responsibility is not commonly described
in terms of constitutional (or public) law in any of the three dimensions identified
above. Since the structure of the international legal system is essentially different
from domestic legal systems, domestic notions of private or public law cannot be
transposed easily to the international level. Alain Pellet rightly warned against
undue domestic analogies when he wrote that international responsibility is nei-
ther public nor private, but "simply international."29
International responsibility is indeed something quite different from domes-
tic, private or domestic public law, and is best treated as sui generis. It is also clear
that there is no automatic connection between a wrong established at interna-
tional level, and a wrong at domestic level. International law does not prescribe
whether an international wrong should have an effect on either private or public
law-this depends on the nature of the claim that is presented in a domestic court.
A breach of international law can as easily take the form of a private law claim, as
a criminal prosecution, or a judicial review under administrative law.3" The do-
mestic effects on U.S. law of the international wrong determined by the ICJ in
27. See generally Benedict Kingsbury et al., The Emergence of Global Administrative Law, LAW &
CONTEMP. PROBs., Summer/Autumn 2005, at 15.
28. See generally Gus VAN HARTEN, INVESTMENT TREATY ARBITRATION AND PUBLIC LAW (2007).
29. Alain Pellet, Can a State Commit a Crime? Definitely, Yes!, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 425, 433-34
(1999).
30. This will be different in those cases in which a treaty as lex specialis prescribes compensation.
See Andr6 Nollkaemper, Internationally Wrongful Acts in Domestic Courts, 101 AM. J. INTL L. 760,
791-94 (2007). Compare this with the situation in the United Kingdom under the Human Rights
Act in DUNCAN FAIRCRIEVE, STATE LIABILITY IN TORT: A COMPARATIVE LAW STUDY 54 (2003).
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Avena," or the effects in Dutch law of international wrongs determined by the
ECtHR,3 2 show that no correlation between the nature of an international wrong
and its translation into domestic private or public wrongs.
A more specific reason why the law of international responsibility is not com-
monly described in terms of constitutional law is that, if one would borrow from
domestic concepts at all, responsibility in international law has been based pri-
marily on a private rather than a public law model. International responsibility
traditionally serves interests of individual states rather than the general interest,
and is characterized by equality rather than subordination.33
International responsibility serves to protect the subjective rights of one state
against infringements by other states.34 In that respect, it shares a dominant fea-
ture of private law.35 The core of the traditional law of international responsibility
is the notion of legal injury caused by a breach of the law.36 Dionisio Anzilotti
wrote that responsibility derives its raison d'etre from the violation of a right of
31. Jogi v. Voges, 425 F.3d 367, 385 (7th Cir. 2005) (holding that Article 36(2) of the Vienna Con-
vention, requiring that domestic law must enable full effect to be given to the purposes for which the
individual rights are intended, meaning "that a country may not reject every single path for vindica-
ting the individual's treaty rights." It then concluded that in the absence of any administrative re-
medy or other alternative to measures that it already had rejected (such as suppression of evidence),
"a damages action is the only avenue left"). This decision was later withdrawn on other grounds in
Jogi v. Voges, 480 F.3d 822 (7th Cir. 2007) (declining to discuss whether the Convention may be the
source of such a remedy since Jogi could pursue his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983).
32. Netherlands/[Defendant], Hoge Raad der Nederlanden [HR] [Supreme Court of the Neth-
erlands] 31 oktober 2003, NJ 2005/196, 3.3 (Neth.). After the ECtHR had determined that the
Netherlands had violated article 3 of the Convention (protection against torture and inhumane
and degrading treatment) but did not provide, in conformity with its usual practice, specific indi-
cations for remedies, the Supreme Court held that this violation constituted a wrongful act under
Dutch law. It then noted that under the Convention, a state is obliged to provide for reparation, but
that the state is free to determine how it will give effect to this obligation in its national legal order.
The Supreme Court said that the reparation need not necessarily be provided in monetary form,
and proceeded to allow early termination of detention as a remedy. Both options seem compatible
with the general obligation to provide reparation under the Convention.
33. One may construe this in terms of the notion of states as moral persons, as postulated by Emerich
de Vattell in preliminaries section 2 of his book THE LAW OF NATIONS (Edward D. Ingraham ed., T. &
J. W. Johnson & Co. 1863) (1758), but embracing that conception is no condition for recognizing the
structural horizontal similarity between states in international law and individuals in domestic law.
34. See generally Albert Bleckmann, The Subjective Right in Public International Law, 28 GER-
MAN Y.B. INT'L L. 144 (1985).
35. Richard Wright, The Grounds and Extent of Legal Responsibility, 41 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 1, 3
(2003) (discussing the concept of interactive justice).
36. Brigitte Stern, A Plea for "Reconstruction" of International Responsibility Based on the Notion of
Legal Injury, in INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 93,
94 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005).
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another state.37 In view of these structural similarities, Hersch Lauterpacht con-
cluded that public international law "belongs to the genus private law"38 and
Thomas Holland said that international law is "private law writ large."39
Remarkable overlap exists between the key principles of international respon-
sibility, as partly codified by the ILC, and the principles of European tort law-
an authoritative set of principles that, to a large extent, are common to domestic
systems in Europe.4 ° Considerable similarities exist on such issues as causation, 41
contribution to the injury by the victim (state),42 responsibility based on negli-
gence or lack of due diligence,43 defenses, 44 and reparations. 45 These similarities
stem from the fact that both European tort law and the law of state responsibility
deal with similar problems of injury caused between equals. It would be odd in-
deed if the law of state responsibility had developed without resorting to domestic
precedents dealing with structurally comparable questions.
46
The fact that the law of international responsibility does not deal with ultra
vires acts by states illustrates its more traditional concern with protection of sub-
jective rights than with illegality (which is more a public law or constitutional
notion). Acts that transgress the legal power of a state, yet do not cause legal in-
jury to another state, generally have not been treated as issues of international re-
sponsibility. An example is a claim for a territorial sea of more than twelve miles.
Such a claim is in excess of the powers that international law allocates to states.
Yet, since it does not cause damage (in a material or legal sense) to other states, it
37. See generally DIoNislo ANZILOTTI, TEORIA GENERALE DELLA RESPONSABILITk DELLO STATO NEL
DIRITTO INTERNAZIONALE (1902).
38. H. LAUTERPACHT, PRIVATE LAW SOURCES AND ANALOGIES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 81 (Law-
book Exch. Ltd. 2002) (1927).
39. THOMAS E. HOLLAND, STUDIES IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 152 (1898).
40. See PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW-TEXT AND COMMENTARY (2005),availableat http://
civil.udg.es/tort/Principles/.
41. Id. art. 3:101.
42. Id. arts. 3:106 and 8: 101. But see Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, art. 39.
43. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAw,supra note 40, arts. 4:101,4:102. But see the general due
diligence standards in international law as discussed by R. Pisillo-Mazzeschi, The Due Diligence
Rule and the Nature of the International Responsibility of States, 35 GERMAN Y.B. INT'L L. 9 (1992).
44. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW, supra note 40, art. 7:101. But see Articles on State Re-
sponsibility, supra note 11, arts. 20-27.
45. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAW, supra note 40, art. 10:101. But see Articles on State Re-
sponsibility, supra note 11, art. 31.
46. See Case Concerning Oil Platforms (Islamic Republic of Iran v. United States of America), 2003
I.C.J. 161,324 (Nov. 6) (separate opinion of Judge Simma). Note also the influence of domestic tort
law on general principles.
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does not give rise to a claim under the law of international responsibility. Such
cases of illegality look more like public law problems, where a holder of public
powers exceeds his competences. Because of a lack of competent institutions that
can deal with such ultra vires acts, international law relies on such doctrines as
protest and non-recognition.47 But protest against an illegal act, or non-recogni-
tion of a situation created by an illegal act, is, in principle, separate from invoca-
tion of responsibility. The commentary to Article 42 of the Articles on State
Responsibility stipulates:
A State does not invoke the responsibility of another State merely
because it criticizes that State for a breach and calls for observance
of the obligation, or even reserves its rights or protests. For the pur-
pose of these articles, protest as such is not an invocation of respon-
sibility; it has a variety of forms and purposes and is not limited to
cases involving State responsibility ... Such informal diplomatic
contacts do not amount to the invocation of responsibility unless
and until they involve specific claims by the State concerned, such
as for compensation for a breach affecting it, or specific action such
as the filing of an application before a competent international tri-
bunal, or even the taking of countermeasures. 48
The fact that the law of international responsibility primarily follows a pri-
vate law model does not mean that it cannot have any constitutional functions.
First, any body of private law may fulfill public functions. Just as domestic tort
law or contract law may fulfill public functions (for example consumer law),49
principles of international responsibility that protect one state from injury may
also fulfill the larger public function of protection.
The second, and more constitutional, layer of the argument is that the law of
international responsibility may fulfill an important role in maintaining the order
in the international system by reinforcing the basic structure of sovereign equality.
Public order relies on the law of responsibility not only for the protection of rights
47. IAN BROWNLIE, SYSTEM OF THE LAw OF NATIONS, STATE RESPONSIBILITY PART I, at 26-27 (1983).
48. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, art. 42, 2.
49. Daniela Caruso, The Missing View of the Cathedral: The Private Law Paradigm of European
Legal Integration, 3 EUR. L.J. 3 (1997); Martijn W. Hesselink, The Structure of the New European
Private Law, 6.4 ELECTRONIC J. CoMP. L. (Dec. 2002), http://www.ejcl.org/64/art64-2.html.
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of individual states, but also for the protection of the integrity of the system."0 Be-
cause of the dominant role of sovereign equality of states in the international legal
order, states respond to breaches of international law based on legal injury, not
only on material damage. Thus, international responsibility may serve a constitu-
tional function in the guise of a private law model. In this respect, the responsibil-
ity of states and international organizations for internationally wrongful acts is a
key element of the rule of law at the international level"' and thereby of the inter-
national constitutional order.
While the law of international responsibility has already fulfilled certain con-
stitutional functions, this constitutional role remains limited. Its focus on subjec-
tive rights of individual states makes the law of international responsibility rather
ill-suited for social order problems. Since the traditional law of responsibility
makes injury to another state a necessary component of responsibility, 2 and re-
sponsibility needs to be "invoked" by another state, the result is that no question of
state responsibility arises as long as no other state invokes the responsibility of a
wrongdoing state. All too often the requirements of damage and invocation make
the law of state responsibility non-operational with respect to large parts of the
breaches that undermine the international legal order.
III. THE EXPANSION OF CONSTITUTIONAL NOTIONS IN THE LAW OF
INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
The modern international law of responsibility has constitutional ambitions
that go beyond the traditional, tort-like system of international responsibility. The
emergence of these constitutional notions is discussed separately for general inter-
national law and then in particular treaty regimes.
A. General International Law
At the heart of the constitutionalization of the law of international responsibility
is the elimination of the notion of legal injury as a condition for international respon-
sibility. Modern international law of responsibility is said to be of an objective na-
50. F.V. Garcia Amador, First Report on State Responsibility, 54-57, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/96
(1956) (citing Clyde Eagleton, International Organization and the Law of Responsibility, in 76 ACAD-
EMIE DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL DE LA HAYE: RECUEIL DES COURS, at 423 (1950)).
51. IAN BROWNLIE, THE RULE OF LAW IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS 213-14 (1988).
52. Stern, supra note 36, at 94.
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ture-not in the sense of responsibility without fault or material damage, but in the
sense that responsibility can arise regardless of legal injury of any particular state. 3
Articles 1 and 2 of the Articles on State Responsibility stipulate two conditions
for responsibility: breach of an obligation and attribution. Injury is not mentioned. 4
The Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations follow the
same approach."5 Responsibility is not contingent upon showing that a disputed act
has caused injury to a state or other person to whom an international obligation is
owed, but is premised on the notion of an illegal act. 6 The law of international re-
sponsibility would not only protect rights of injured parties but would also protect
the international legal order against acts that violate international law.57
The practical consequence of eliminating legal injury as a condition of respon-
sibility is that the obligations of cessation, continued performance, and reparation
are not contingent on invocation by a responsible state. Whereas the ILC in the first
reading took the position that reparation was a right of an injured state, in the sec-
ond reading it accepted that the obligation to provide reparation is not dependent on
a prior invocation of responsibility. 8 This may redress one of the largest weaknesses
of the traditional law of international responsibility as identified above: the fact that
the absence of invocation (for political or other reasons) rendered the law of respon-
sibility non-operational regarding acts that upset the international legal order. The
law of responsibility, as drafted by the ILC, has introduced the protection of legality
as a freestanding legal consequence. Indeed, the obligation of cessation,59 and the
53. See Pellet, supra note 29, at 438.
54. See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, Commentary to art. 2, 9, available at
http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/commentaries/9_6-2001.pdf.
55. ILC, supra note 12, art. 3.
56. John Gardner, The Mark of Responsibility, 23 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 157, 164 (2003); Alain
Pellet, Remarques sur une rivolution inachevee. Le projet d'articles de la CDI sur la responsabilit6 des
Etats, 42 ANNUAIRE FRAN AIS DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL 7 (1996); Stern, supra note 36, at 101. Com-
pare the discussion of principles of reparation by James Crawford, Third Report on State Responsi-
bility, 26, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/507 (2000) (stating that "the general obligation of reparation arises
automatically upon the commission of the internationally wrongful act. That obligation is not, as
such, contingent upon a demand or protest by any injured State, even if the form that reparation
should take in the circumstances may be contingent.").
57. Stern, supra note 36, at 94 (noting that it would introduce a "review of legality through the
institutions of international responsibility").
58. See Crawford, supra note 56, 26.
59. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, art. 30(a).
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obligation to provide guarantees of non-repetition, ° have more to do with a return
to legality than with reparation for injury.6
The fundamental nature of the shift in the law of international responsibility
that is brought on by the introduction of the notion of objective responsibility was
noted by France in its comments on the ILC draft articles. France commented
that draft Article 1 of the Articles on State Responsibility was not acceptable be-
cause it attempts to set up an international public order and to defend objective
legality instead of subjective state rights. The aims of the law of responsibility
should not extend to protection of international law itself.62 However, other states
appear to have few problems with the notion and, therefore, this can be accepted
as a statement of the law.
Responsibility, abstracted from any particular injured party who may seek
relief, is a rather esoteric notion. What does it really mean (other than an obliga-
tion of cessation that already flows from the primary norm itself) to provide repa-
ration, if there is no invocation of responsibility? It is not easy to see how a court
or other institution could consider a case of responsibility, determine injury, and
fashion appropriate relief, in the absence of injured parties.63 Nonetheless, basing
responsibility on illegality rather than injury is not an insignificant symbolic step
toward a more public law and a constitutionally-oriented law of responsibility. It
demonstrates that when a state breaches an international obligation, certain legal
consequences flow from that act, irrespective of whether another state has the in-
terest or political courage of invoking the responsibility of the wrongdoing state.
The platonic nature of the notion of responsibility as a constitutional concept is
to some extent remedied by the introduction in the Articles on State Responsibility
of the possibility that non-injured states can invoke state responsibility. While Arti-
cle 42 grants a right to injured states to invoke responsibility, Article 48 discards the
requirement of legal injury as a condition for invocation in regard to breaches of
obligations owed either to a group of states that are established for the protection of
a collective interest of the group or to the international community as a whole.' The
same holds for Article 52 of the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International
60. Id. art. 30(b).
61. Stern,supra note 36, at 102.
62. ILC, State Responsibility, Comments and Observations Received From Governments, U.N. Doc.
A/CN.4/488 (Mar. 25, 1998); see also Stern,supra note 36, at 99, n.12.
63. Alain Pellet wrote that these public forms of international responsibility are platonic.
NGUYEN Quoc DINH ET AL., DROIT INTERNATIONAL PUBLIc 765 (6th ed. 1999).
64. See Edith Brown Weiss, Invoking State Responsibility in the Twenty-First Century, 96 AM. J.
INT'L L. 798 (2002).
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Organisations. Upon breach of these norms, any state other than an injured state is
entitled to invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state. When a treaty protects
the collective interest of the parties, all states party to that treaty could invoke re-
sponsibility as if they were "private attorneys-general" and thereby fulfil a public
function.65 All states could also invoke the responsibility of a state that violates a jus
cogens norm, such as the obligation to protect fundamental human rights or the
prohibition of genocide, not because their subjective rights are affected or because
they would suffer legal injury, but because they are empowered to enforce the inter-
est of the international community.6 6 This is a quintessentially constitutional con-
struction based on the recognition of a category of public interest norms.
The decision of the ILC to not qualify the interests of these third-party states,
in terms of legal injury, has been critiqued and may not have been necessary.67 It
probably was induced by the unfortunate decision to include countermeasures in
the law of responsibility. Since the right to take countermeasures is restricted to
injured states68 and granting the right to take countermeasures to indirectly in-
jured states is controversial,69 the category of injured states must be restricted to
what now is covered by Article 42.70 While it would have been possible to qualify
the interests covered by Article 48 in terms of legal injury, for present purposes it
would not have made much of a difference. Either way, the law of international
responsibility grants all parties to a treaty the right to invoke responsibility for the
protection of a collective interest of the group, as well as the right to invoke re-
sponsibility for the protection of the international community as a whole.
The constitutional ambitions of the law of responsibility are particularly clear
with regard to serious violations of peremptory norms. These are not only wrongful
against a state entitled to performance of an obligation, but also vis-A-vis the interna-
tional community of states as a whole. International law obliges all states to take
measures to bring such wrongs to an end, and prohibits states from recognizing a
65. William B. Rubenstein, On What a Private Attorney General Is-and Why It Matters, 57
VAND. L. REV. 2129 (2004).
66. See generally CHRISTIAN J. TAMS, ENFORCING OBLIGATIONS ERGA OMNES IN INTERNATIONAL
LAW (2005).
67. Stern, supra note 36.
68. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, art. 49(1).
69. See the saving clause in id. art. 54. See generally Denis Alland, Countermeasures of General
Interest, 13 EUR. J. INT'L L. 1221 (2002).
70. Julia Barboza, Legal Injury: The Tip of the Iceberg in the Law of State Responsibility, in INTER-
NATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY TODAY 7,21 (2005).
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situation created by such a breach as lawful.7' These articles have been critiqued
because they do not impose any obligation on the wrongdoing state apart from what
any wrongdoing state would be obliged to do anyway. Still, this may not be the
point. What Article 41 adds is an obligation of other states to take action to induce
and secure a return to legality, quite irrespective of claims for reparation.
The reliance on individual states to seek return to legality is not what one would
expect to find in domestic constitutional law. Though the ILC has explored the link
between these public order principles and the institutions of the United Nations,
72
the adopted text does not incorporate any institutional mechanisms. Given the ab-
sence of proper international institutions that could enforce the law and secure le-
gality (which in itself reflects the very modest stage of constitutionalization of
international law), there were few other options. The default position was to add
public order arrangements to a well-established set of principles devised for different
problems, and to leave the protection of public order to the states.
Compared to the public order side effects of the traditional, bilateral law of re-
sponsibility, the removal of the concept of legal injury, the recognition of the rights
of all states to invoke responsibility in case of breached norms protecting the collec-
tive interest, and the formulation of obligations on all states to respond to a serious
breach of peremptory norms, have added a stronger constitutional nature to the law
of responsibility. This strengthens the organizational power of the law of responsi-
bility, adds to its power to control illegal acts, and at the same time reflects and
contributes to the recognition of public interest norms in international law.
B. Treaty Regimes
While the emergence of constitutional notions in the law of international re-
sponsibility is to some extent a paper exercise, particular treaty regimes show that
constitutional notions can have practical effects. One example is the European Con-
vention on Human Rights. Traditionally, the system of the Convention was based
on injury. Under the Convention, individuals whose human rights are violated may
invoke the responsibility of the wrongdoing state.73 This system is more analogous
71. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, arts. 40-41. Similar provisions are contained
in the Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, supra note 12, arts.
44-45.
72. ILC,Addendum to Eighth Report on State Responsibility, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/476/Add.1 (May
14, 1996) (prepared by Gaetano Arangio-Ruiz).
73. ECHR art. 34.
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to public law remedies74 than to tort-type claims, but in either construction the Con-
vention depends on injury. The obligation to provide reparation that follows from
the ECtHR's determination of wrongfulness concerns reparation to the injured vic-
tim. If insufficient reparation is provided at the domestic level, under Article 41, the
ECtHR can order the state to provide just satisfaction to the victim." Though its
general approach is narrow, the ECtHR has always recognized the broader interests
it served in its motivation and reasoning in the sphere of remedies.
In recent case law, the ECtHR has moved away from the injury-based model.76
In cases like Broniowski7  and Sejdovic, 78 the ECtHR departed from its traditional
approach of doing justice in individual cases and determined what general measures
were necessary to remove inconsistencies between the Convention and domestic law.
Although the ECtHR does not expressly formulate this approach in terms of
principles of responsibility, its approach can be seen as an application of the obliga-
tion to provide guarantees of non-repetition. In interstate cases, guarantees of non-
repetition are commonly sought when "the injured State has reason to believe that
the mere restoration of the pre-existing situation does not protect it satisfactorily."'79
Repeal of legislation that allowed the breach to occur is one way to provide guaran-
tees of non-repetition." This is also applicable to international responsibility vis-A-
vis individuals for human rights violations. The ECtHR has made clear that its
orders for general measures are aimed at the future, not (as is the case for its orders
under Article 41 of the Convention) at the past, and that they seek to remove the
legislation that allowed the breach to occur. This would lead to future breaches
without remedial action. In Broniowski, the ECtHR noted that:
in view of the systemic situation which it has identified, the Court
would observe that general measures at national level are undoubt-
edly called for in execution of the present judgment, measures
74. VAN HARTEN, SUpra note 28, at 145 (discussing public law remedies in the context of invest-
ment law).
75. ECHR art. 41.
76. Valerio Colondrea, On the Power of the European Court of Human Rights to Order Specific Non-
monetary Measures: Some Remarks in the Light of the Assanidze, Broniowski and Sejdovic Cases, 7
HUM. RTS. L. REV. 396-411 (2007); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The European Convention on Human
Rights and International Public Order, 5 CAMBRIDGE Y.B. EUR. LEGAL STUD. 237 (2004).
77. Broniowski v. Poland, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1 (2006).
78. Sejdovic v. Italy, 42 Eur. Ct. H.R. 360 (2006).
79. JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION'S ARTICLES ON STATE RESPONSIBIL-
ITY 198 (2002).
80. Id. at 199.
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which must take into account the many people affected. Above all,
the measures adopted must be such as to remedy the systemic de-
fect underlying the Court's finding of a violation so as not to over-
burden the Convention system with large numbers of applications
deriving from the same cause.8'
The ECtHR thus assumed the role of a quasi-constitutional court by verify-
ing the compatibility of domestic law with the Convention, irrespective of indi-
vidual injury.
Another example of a treaty regime that displays, in the application of princi-
ples of responsibility, certain constitutional features is the World Trade Organiza-
tion (WTO) Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSU). The DSU does not provide
for reparation for past injury, but instead aims at ensuring legality and compliance
in the future.82 Though there is room for discussion on whether the DSU could or
should order retrospective remedies,83 as it in fact it did in the Australia-Leather
case, 84 this is not its primary aim. In terms of principles of responsibility, it is mostly
concerned with return to legality through cessation and continued performance.
Moreover, under certain conditions, the DSU allows a wide category of states
to bring a claim against a wrongdoing state. In European Communities-Regime
for the Importation, Sale and Distribution of Bananas, the Appellate Body (AB)
agreed with the panel that the DSU does not contain any explicit requirement
that a member must have a "legal interest" as a prerequisite for requesting a pan-
el.8" It then held that, although the United States had "no legal right or interest" in
the case, its interest in trade in bananas, together with the general interest in en-
forcement of WTO rules, were sufficient to establish a right to pursue a WTO
81. Broniowski, 43 Eur. Ct. H.R., 193.
82. Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of Disputes, Apr. 15,
1994, Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization, Annex 2, Legal Instru-
ments-Results of the Uruguay Round, 33 I.L.M. 1123 (1994), available at http://www.wto.org/
english/tratop-e/dispu-e/dsue.htm#3. See generally Marco Bronckers & Naboth van den Broek,
Financial Compensation in the WTO: Improving Remedies in WTO Dispute Settlement, in REFORM
AND DEVELOPMENT OF THE WTO DISPUTE SETTLEMENT SYSTEM 43 (2006).
83. See generally Joel P. Trachtman, Building the WTO Cathedral, 43 STAN. J. INT'L L. 127 (2007).
84. Panel Report,Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters ofAutomotive Leather-
Recourse to Article 21.5 of the DSU by the United States, WT/DS126/RW (Jan. 21, 2000) (holding that
Article 19.1 of the DSU does not limit remedies under Article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement to purely
prospective action). See generally Gavin Goh & Andreas R. Ziegler, Retrospective Remedies in the
WTO After Automotive Leather, 6 J. INT'L ECON. L. 545 (2003).
85. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Regimefor the Importation, Sale and Distri-
bution of Bananas, 132, WT/DS27/AB/R (Sept. 25, 1997).
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dispute settlement proceeding "since any deviation from the negotiated balance of
rights and obligations is more likely than ever to affect them, directly or
indirectly." 6 The use of the term "legal interest" is confusing; surely all states
party to the treaty have a legal interest in seeking compliance with its rules.8 7 In
view of its reference to the potential stakes of the United States in the banana
trade, the AB did not accept a general actio popularis, and provided for a nar-
rower category of states that could invoke responsibility than Article 48 of the
Articles on State Responsibility. Nonetheless, the AB accorded the United States a
role as "private attorney-general" with the power to seek return to legality, at least
in part based on the wider interest of a rule-based system.
The role of the DSU in seeking return to legality and the recognition of the
right of all state parties to bring a case before it can be seen as part of the process that
has led several commentators to speak of the WTO in constitutional terms.8
IV. INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY AS A UNITARY SYSTEM
The law of international responsibility may serve two interests: the protection
of subjective rights of injured parties and the protection of the legal order.8 9 The
question to be considered now is whether both functions can be served by one
unitary set of principles.
A. The Notion of Unity
The rules on the International Responsibility of States and the Responsibility
of International Organizations form a single, unitary system. 9 International law
subjects all breaches of any rule of international law, irrespective of the origin and
contents of these rules, to a relatively uniform set of secondary principles. Con-
trary to many national systems, it does not distinguish between contractual and
86. Id. 136.
87 Joost Pauwelyn, The Nature of WTO Obligations (Jean Monnet Working Papers No. 1/02,
2002), available at http://www.jeanmonnetprogram.org/papers/02/020101.html; see also JOOST
PAUWELYN, CONFLICT OF NORMS IN PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW: How WTO LAW RELATES TO
OTHER RULES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (2003).
88. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Constitutional Conceits: The WTO's "Constitution" and the Discipline of
International Law, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 647 (2006); Markus Krajewski, Democratic Legitimacy and
Constitutional Perspectives of WTO Law, 35 J. WORLD TRADE 167 (2001); Joel P. Trachtman, The
Constitutions of the WTO, 17 EUR. J. INT'L L. 623 (2006).
89. Barboza,supra note 70, at 19-20.
90. Crawford & Olleson,supra note 2, at 451.
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tortious responsibility, or between civil, criminal, or other forms of public law
(administrative) responsibility.9'
To say that all breaches of any rule of a particular system of law are subject to
a unitary system of responsibility does not necessarily mean that system can only
fulfill one function. Just as domestic tort law or domestic criminal law may fulfill
a wide variety of functions without affecting its unitary status, the multiple func-
tions of the law of responsibility do not in itself preclude its unitary nature.
To say that all breaches of any rule of a particular system of law are subject to
a unitary system of responsibility also does not mean that such a system cannot
make distinctions. In tort law, it is common to differentiate between liability based
on fault and liability for particularly risky activities, which may be subject to strict
liability.92 This does not necessarily undermine the claim that the principles of
European tort law are a unitary set of principles. Likewise, the mere fact that the
law of state responsibility makes serious breaches of peremptory norms subject to
a special regime93 does not necessarily mean that such breaches cannot be part of
the same system of responsibility.
Rather, what is meant by the law of responsibility as a unitary system is that
the various forms of responsibility (strict liability, ordinary wrongs, wrongs aris-
ing out of serious breaches of peremptory norms) are subject to the same general
principles of responsibility, and that they form a relatively coherent whole. Thus,
although ultra-hazardous activities are subject to strict rather than fault liability,
they are subject to the same principles of, among others, attribution, causation,
and reparation. Because of the connecting effects of these common principles,
they still may be thought of as part of a coherent system. Likewise, although
somewhat controversial, it is thought that serious breaches of peremptory norms
are subject to the same principles of attribution, defenses, and reparation as ordi-
nary wrongful acts. In the Genocide case, the ICJ stated that the particular char-
acteristics of genocide do not justify the ICJ in departing from the normal criteria
for attribution as they apply under general international law:
[t]he rules for attributing alleged internationally wrongful conduct
to a State do not vary with the nature of the wrongful act in question
91. See generally Rainbow Warrior (N.Z. v Fr.), 20 R.I.A.A. 217 (1990); Crawford & Olleson,
supra note 2, at 451-52.
92. See generally Franz Werro et al., Strict Liability in European Tort Law: An Introduction, in THE
BOUNDARIES OF STRICT LIABILITY IN EUROPEAN TORT LAW 3 (Franz Werro &Vernon Valentine eds.,
2004).
93. See Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, arts. 40-41.
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in the absence of a clearly expressed lex specialis. Genocide will be
considered as attributable to a State if and to the extent that the phys-
ical acts constitutive of genocide that have been committed by organs
or persons other than the State's own agents were carried out, wholly
or in part, on the instructions or directions of the State, or under its
effective control. This is the state of customary international law, as
reflected in the ILC Articles on State Responsibility. "
By contrast, liability for injurious consequences of acts not prohibited by in-
ternational law is subject to an altogether different set of principles." Notably, one
of the two foundations for international responsibility, breach of an international
obligation, is not applicable at all. The Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss
in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out of Hazardous Activities also
contain nothing on circumstances precluding wrongfulness, and have an alto-
gether different set of forms of reparation.
Whether or not two forms of responsibility do or do not form part of a uni-
tary system, to some extent, is a relative matter. It depends first on how one defines
the system. Second, on how many exceptions one allows before concluding that
the exceptions overtake the common ground, resulting in two sets of principles
rather than one unitary set. As with the example of strict liability in the principles
of European tort law, some principles may be inapplicable without the body of
law, as a whole, losing its unitary character. However, at some point, the excep-
tions overtake the principle and one unitary system may turn into two systems.
The location of the breaking point may depend on a wide variety of consider-
ations. Coherence of a set of principles is one such consideration, though one that
may lead to different conclusions for different observers. The ILC's decision to cre-
ate a separate system for acts not prohibited by international law has been critiqued
as conceptually unnecessary. 6 From the perspective of the drafters of the text, the
94. Case Concerning the Application of the Convention on the Prevention and the Punishment of the
Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and Montenegro), 401 (Feb. 26, 2007), avail-
able at http://www.icj-cij.org/docket/files/91/13685.pdf. For a brief discussion of the question
whether attribution in cases of serious breaches of peremptory norms are governed by the same
principles as ordinary wrongs, see Andr6 Nollkaemper, Concurrence Between Individual Responsi-
bility and State Responsibility in International Law, 52 1NT'L & CoMp. L.Q. 615 (2003).
95. ILC, Draft Principles on the Allocation of Loss in the Case of Transboundary Harm Arising Out
of Hazardous Activities, 1 66, U.N. Doc. A/61/l0 (2006), available at http://untreaty.un.org/ilc/
texts/instruments/english/draft%20artices/9_0O2006.pdf.
96. See generally Alan E. Boyle, State Responsibility and International Liability for Injurious Conse-
quences of Acts not Prohibited by International Law:A Necessary Distinction?, 39 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. I
LAW OF INTERNATIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
acceptability of either one or two separate drafts will form an altogether different
consideration. This may help explain why, even at the peak of the attempt to intro-
duce the notion of state crimes in what are now the Articles on State Responsibility,
the option to disconnect state responsibility from breaches of state responsibility for
crimes was not high on the agenda. No general answers are available to the question
of when a set of principles should cease to be a unitary whole and much will depend
on context-specific considerations, including political ones.
B. Ruptures in the Law of Responsibility
The introduction of constitutional elements into the law of international re-
sponsibility undermines its unitary nature. Stern refers to this as a "rupture of re-
sponsibility" by introducing incompatible notions in what is supposed to be a
coherent body of law.97 The introduction of constitutional notions into the law of
international responsibility appears to have created a separation between some
principles that look primarily or exclusively to the "private law" function of repa-
ration for injury, and other principles that look primarily or exclusively to the
constitutional functions.
Large parts of the law of international responsibility, in particular the articles
on reparation and countermeasures, remain rooted in the idea that responsibility
is based on a breach of an obligation toward a person who is entitled to the perfor-
mance of that obligation. 98 Somewhat paradoxically, in light of Articles 1 and 2 of
the Articles on State Responsibility (that do not require injury as a condition for
responsibility), the principles of reparation make clear that no remedy is provided
for breaches of international obligations where no material or moral damage has
occurred. In other words, there is no responsibility without injury." Article 31
provides that there must be full reparation for the damage, whether material or
moral, caused by the internationally wrongful act.
However, the protection of objective legality in Article 1, as well as the engage-
ment of third states through Articles 48 and 41 is (at least as envisaged by the ILC)
(1990) (a critical discussion of the distinction).
97. Stern, supra note 36, at 99.
98. Arguably, any concept of international responsibility (or, more broadly formulated, account-
ability) requires a relationship between the wrongdoing actor and an account-holder, or accountee.
See MARK BovENS, THE QUEST FOR RESPONSIBILITY: ACCOUNTABILITY AND CITIZENSHIP IN COM-
PLEX ORGANIZATIONS 23-24 (1998); see also Stern, supra note 36, at 93. But see Gardner, supra note
56, at 164-65 (critiquing the relational conception of responsibility).
99. Barboza, supra note 70, at 9.
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not premised on legal injury, but rather on protecting the public order. The coexis-
tence of reparation-for-injury principles and protection-of-legality principles applies
similarly in the Draft Articles on Responsibility of International Organizations.
In the latter articles, the ILC also accepted that transgression of the obliga-
tions of a foundational treaty would lead to responsibility of the organization to its
member states. It is not easy to see that the responsibility that flows from ultra
vires acts vis-A-vis member states, even though the acts certainly can violate the
rights of member states, is necessarily of the same character as responsibility to-
ward a third state to which an organization would cause damage. In the United
Kingdom, ultra vires administrative acts that cause loss do not give rise to liability
per se. Satisfying the conditions for annulment in a judicial review action does not
necessarily equate with wrongfulness as expressed in the breach of a duty of care
in negligence.' This may be equally true in international law. Indeed, it may be
better to say that these are ultra vires acts, akin to a proclamation of a 100-mile
territorial sea, that do not necessarily trigger responsibility.'
Many principles of international responsibility will be applicable to all forms of
responsibility, thus to some extent maintaining the unity of the law of responsibility.
However, this cannot be presumed. Consider the following example. In their re-
sponses to the ILC, several organizations referred to case law of administrative tri-
bunals as support for the transposition of the principle of necessity, as adopted in the
state responsibility articles, to the responsibility of international organization. 12 It is
not obvious that this is really the same principle of necessity. Is the requirement of
protection of a state against a "grave and imminent peril"'0 3 equally applicable to the
relationship between an organization and an employee? The principle in its public
law-type relationships would have a somewhat different form and meaning.
Despite the two quite different forms of logic that they embody, and the possi-
ble effects these differences have on the content of the "common" principle, main-
stream opinion would still say that the principles of responsibility form a unitary
whole. Given the flexibility of the concept of unity itself, one need not object. How-
ever, unity and common ground are limited and probably decreasing.
100. FAIRGRIEVE,SUpra note 30, at 43; MARTINA KUNNECKE, TRADITION AND CHANGE IN ADMINIS-
TRATIVE LAW 174 (2007) (for the separate treatment of judicial review and liability as part of ad-
ministrative law).
101. BROWNLIE, supra note 47, at 30.
102. International Labour Organization Administrative Tribunal, Judgment No. 2183 (Mar. 2,
2003), cited in ILC, Responsibility of International Organizations-Comments and Observations Re-
ceived From International Organizations, 7-8, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/568 (Mar. 17, 2006).
103. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, art. 25(1)(a).
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C. Mechanisms to Maintain Unity
The fact that ruptures, and certainly the inconsistencies in the law of interna-
tional responsibility caused by the process of constitutionalization, have been rela-
tively modest may be explained in part by the use of certain conflict-avoidance
techniques. These techniques allow for differentiation in the law of responsibility
without affecting the core principles.
One such conflict-avoidance technique is the strict separation between primary
and secondary norms. For instance, by deferring the fundamental question of fault
to primary rules, the law of international responsibility has been able to survive as a
relatively narrow set of rules that is possibly applicable to all wrongful acts. If fault
would have been maintained in the body of secondary rules, it would have been
much harder to maintain the present text as a unitary set of principles."° Likewise,
international law has been able to prevent recognizing a basic liability norm of the
sort recognized by the Principles of European Tort Law ("[a] person to whom dam-
age to another is legally attributed is liable to compensate that damage")' by relying
on a general (primary) due diligence norm. Breach of that norm, in many respects,
will lead to the same result as the result envisaged by the basic norm of the Principles
of European Tort Law. However, by deferring it to the primary norms, it prevents
the law of responsibility from acquiring an all too private law nature, which possibly
would cause more conflicts with the emerging constitutionalization.
The use of lex specialis in the system of international responsibility has also
allowed the law of international responsibility to largely maintain its unity. 6 This
allows regimes such as the European Convention of Human Rights and the WTO
to pursue their own constitutional ambitions without directly affecting the coher-
ence of the general principles. In the law of responsibility of international organi-
zations, "rules of the organization" provide an additional safety valve. For instance,
Article 35(2) of the draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organiza-
tions provides the general principle that a responsible international organization
may not rely on its rules as justification for failure to comply with its obligations
"is without prejudice to the applicability of the rules of an international organiza-
tion in respect of the responsibility of the organization towards its member States
104. Even though fault has been removed entirely from the law of responsibility, see e.g., Gaetnao
Arangio-Ruiz, State Fault and the Forms and Degrees of International Responsibility: Questions of
Attribution and Relevance, in LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL AU SERVICE DE LA PAIX, DE LA JUSTICE ET DU
DiVELOPPEMENT 25, 25-26 (Manges Michel Virally ed., 1991).
105. PRINCIPLES OF EUROPEAN TORT LAw,supra note 40, art. 1:101.
106. Articles on State Responsibility, supra note 11, art. 55.
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and organizations." This would seem to allow for the application of special rules
of responsibility, which may deviate from the general law of responsibility.
A third reason why the law of international responsibility has largely been
able to maintain its unity is that, in practice, states and international institutions
prefer to handle public law aspects arising out of nonperformance of international
obligations outside the law of international responsibility. This is quite obvious for
highly political issues. One of the reasons for the demise of the concept of state
crimes is the fact that states preferred to leave the consequences of serious viola-
tions of fundamental international norms to political organs, notably the U.N.
Security Council."7 It is also generally true that states and international organiza-
tions do not treat public order questions in terms of responsibility. They do not
seem to consider nonperformance of obligations under international environmen-
tal treaties as a matter of international responsibility. Indeed, they are precisely a
response to the limits of the conceptual structures and limitations of the classical
doctrine of state responsibility.'
Reliance mechanisms of lex specialis and institutional solutions that are not
qualified as issues of responsibility may save unity. As a consequence, the scope
and practical effect of the core body of principles of international responsibility is
marginalized. States, international organizations, and international courts may
seek solutions for particular questions of responsibility outside the law of respon-
sibility as codified by the ILC.' 9
D. Possible Costs of Hanging on to Unity
One might take the position that the question of whether or not a particular
set of principles forms a unity is a matter of doctrinal interest only. However, in
addition to the marginalization of the general part of the law of international re-
sponsibility as identified above, certain other costs may be involved.
First, the coexistence of "reparation for injury principles" and "consequences
of illegality principles" may have institutional consequences. The emphasis that
the ECtHR now places on guarantees of non-repetition, signaling its increasing
constitutional role in the protection of legality, may eventually make the ECtHR
107. See, e.g., ILC, State Responsibility: Comments and Observations Received From Governments,
art. 41, U.N. Doc A/CN.4/515 (Mar. 19,2001).
108. Jutta Brunn~e, International Legal Accountability Through the Lens of the Law of State Re-
sponsibility, 36 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 21 (2005).
109. Cf. Christine Gray, The Choice Between Restitution and Compensation, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 413,
418, 422-23 (1999).
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less accessible for compensation claims. This development is hardly compatible
with the original injury-based approach of the ECtHR-and will not always help
claimants find the relief they seek. These effects might be more a consequence of
organizational problems of the ECtHR than a necessary consequence of the use
of multiple principles and aims of responsibility. Indeed, there seems to be an in-
extricable link between the two.
Second, the coexistence of two sets of principles with different aims and differ-
ent natures may lead to inconsistencies. One example is the relationship between the
regime under Article 48 and the law of diplomatic protection." ' Article 48(3) ex-
pressly makes the invocation of responsibility by an interested state subject to the
same requirements as invocation by an injured state-requirements that are con-
tained in Articles 43-45. Article 44 (a) provides that a state may not invoke the re-
sponsibility of another if "the claim is not brought in accordance with any applicable
rule relating to the nationality of claims." It deferred the definition of this rule to its
work on diplomatic protection."' This is hard to reconcile with the ILC's claim,
made in the commentary to its Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, that the in-
vocation of responsibility by an interested State under Article 48(1)(b) is not subject to
the conditions set out in Article 44, including the nationality of claims rule."2
The 2006 Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection are predicated on the link of
nationality and thus preclude the protection of non-nationals. This ensures that the
"communitarian promise" of Article 48(1)(b) remains largely ineffective. This con-
clusion is supported by draft Article 8 on the protection of refugees."' lain Scobbie
110. See lain Scobbie, Assumptions and Presuppositions: State Responsibility for System Crimes, in
SYSTEM CRIMINALITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW (Andr6 Nollkaemper & Harmen van der Wilt eds.,
forthcoming 2009); see also Annemarieke Vermeer-Kiiunzli, A Matter of Interest: Diplomatic Pro-
tection and State Responsibility Erga Omnes, 56 INT'L & CoMP. L.Q. 553 (2007).
111. See ILC,supra note 10, 2, n.683.
112. ILC, Report of the International Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with
Commentaries, art. 16, 2, n.245, U.N. Doc. A/61/10 (2006). But see Enrico Milano, Diplomatic
Protection and Human Rights Before the International Court of Justice: Re-fashioning Tradition?, 35
NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 85, 103-08 (2004).
113. Article 8 provides:
1. A State may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a stateless person
who, at the date of injury and at the date of the official presentation of the
claim, is lawfully and habitually resident in that State.
2. A State may exercise diplomatic protection in respect of a person who is recog-
nized as a refugee by that State, in accordance with internationally accepted
standards, when that person, at the date of injury and at the date of the official
presentation of the claim, is lawfully and habitually resident in that State.
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rightly asks "[i]f a State cannot seek remedies for non-nationals established within
its territory for injuries caused by their national State, how can it seek the 'perfor-
mance of the obligation of reparation' for those with whom it lacks all connection?
How could it establish that it was acting in their interest?""'
Third, maintaining unity means that value is attached to protecting the com-
mon ground. However, protecting the common ground may go at the cost of re-
finement, detail, and progress in those areas where there is no common ground.
Both the principles of responsibility applying to reparation for injury and the
principles seeking a more constitutional function may remain relatively undevel-
oped as a result of the attempt to keep them together.
As to the former, although the law of international responsibility has largely
followed a private law model, from the perspective of the interests that private law
may need to serve, it remains rather undeveloped. Major issues that need to be
addressed when tort claims have to be decided are barely developed. Examples are
questions of extinctive prescription,"5 joint and several liability,"6 and causation." 7
Perhaps due to the fact that so few international claims actually lead to monetary
damages, such lacune are mostly unnoticed at the level of general international
law. The increasing judicialization of the law of international responsibility may
make the need for a developed system of "private wrongs" for the handling of in-
ternational claims more important. The rather undeveloped principles for han-
dling civil claims were, for instance, felt in the determination of loss in the U.N.
Compensation Commission, 8 the Ethiopia-Eritrea Claims Commission,"9 and
in the virtual absence of "private law" principles that the International Criminal
3. Paragraph 2 does not apply in respect of an injury caused by an internation-
ally wrongful act of the State of nationality of the refugee.
ILC, supra note 113, art. 8.
114. Scobbie, supra note 110 (manu. at 30).
115. See, e.g., KAJ HOBIfR, EXTINCTIVE PRESCRIPTION AND APPLICABLE LAW IN INTERSTATE ARBI-
TRATION (2001).
116. See, e.g., John E. Noyes & Brian D. Smith, State Responsibility and the Principle of Joint and
Several Liability, 13 YALE J. INT'L L. 225 (1988).
117. See, e.g., TAL BECKER, TERRORISM AND THE STATE: RETHINKING THE RULEs OF STATE RESPONSIBIL-
rrY (2006); Fran ois Rigaux, International Responsibility and the Principle of Causality, in INTERNATIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY TODAY: ESSAYS IN MEMORY OF OSCAR SCHACHTER 81 (Maurizio Ragazzi ed., 2005).
118. David D. Caron, The UNCC and the Search for Practical Justice, in THE UNITED NATIONS
COMPENSATION COMMISSION 367,377 (Richard B. Lillich ed., 1995).
119. Won Kidane, Civil Liability for Violations of International Law: The Jurisprudence of the Eri-
trea-Ethiopia Claims Commission in The Hague, 25 WIS. INT'L L. J. 23, 37-38 (2007).
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Court can apply in handling claims by a victim. 2 ' Also, the ECtHR has been
forced to develop its own lex specialis on several such issues. 2'
On the other hand, the constitutional dimensions of the law of international
responsibility also remain relatively undeveloped. The recognition and develop-
ment of public law or "constitutional" principles may have been hampered by the
fact that states did not wish to label these principles in terms of legal responsibility,
which would associate them with the traditional unitary responsibility. As long as
only one unitary body of responsibility exists, the formulation of principles of re-
sponsibility either would have to occur within that paradigm or would be discon-
nected altogether. Choosing the latter has led to a grey area of practices and
principles that are not qualified in terms of illegality, even though that is exactly
what they are concerned with.
A wide variety of treaty mechanisms now provide for some form of "account-
ability short of responsibility" in response to treaty violations by states or interna-
tional organizations."' While such processes do involve accountability, including
in the sense that a "forum" assesses whether conduct is compatible with prior es-
tablished rules or principles, and some form of sanction (formal or informal) may
follow,'23 in terms of outcomes, such mechanisms do not involve a determination
of responsibility.'24 That conclusion is not affected by the fact that some of these
procedures, notably the compliance procedures under the Aarhuus Convention,
do frequently refer to principles of responsibility. 2 ' Such procedures are not pri-
marily concerned with making things good for victims, but are instruments to
secure control of public power, to limit abuses of power, and to further the rule of
law. They resemble more a public law concept of ultra vires acts and, in many re-
spects, may be more akin to constitutional or administrative law principles.'26
120. Gioia Greco, Victims' Rights Overview Under the ICC Legal Framework: A Jurisprudential
Analysis, 7 INT'L CRIM. L. REV. 531, 533-34 (2007).
121. Matti Pellonp~i, Individual Reparation Claims Under the European Convention on Human
Rights, in STATE RESPONSIBILITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: REPARATION IN INSTANCES OF GRAVE VIOLA-
TIONS OF HUMAN RIHTS 109 (1999).
122. See Geir Ulfstein et al., Introduction to MAKING TREATIES WORK: HUMAN RIGHTS, ENVIRON-
MENT AND ARMS CONTROL, supra note 23, at 6.
123. Deidre Curtin & Andr6 Nollkaemper, Conceptualizing Accountability in International and
European Law, 36 NETH. Y.B. INT'L L. 3 (2005).
124. Martti Koskenniemi, Breach of Treaty or Non-Compliance? Reflections on the Enforcement of
the Montreal Protocol, 3 Y.B. INT'L ENVTL. L. 123, 145-46 (1992).
125. See CASE LAW OF THE AARHUS CONVENTION COMPLIANCE COMMITTEE (2004-2OO8) (A. An-
drusevych et al. eds., 2008).
126. Kingsbury, supra note 27, at 61.
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In the framework of international organizations, actions taken by interna-
tional organizations against member states in response to non-compliance by such
members are probably best treated under the special regime of the rules of the
organization, rather than under the concept of countermeasures as they apply in
the general law of responsibility of international organizations.12 The question of
implementation of the responsibility of member states by international institu-
tions has been treated neither in the law of state responsibility, nor in the law of
international organization responsibility, leaving it generally to the rules of the
organization and outside the law of responsibility.' 28
There has therefore emerged a body of principles and practices that deal with
the core aspects of constitutionalization identified in Part I (organization, control of
legality, and public interest values) separate from the law of international responsi-
bility, and indeed not commonly discussed in terms of responsibility. While consti-
tutionalization is partly reflected in the law of responsibility, the constitutional forms
of responsibility and accountability are primarily developed outside this body of law.
It is remarkable that so much ink has been spilled over Article 48 of the Articles on
State Responsibility, whereas much less attention has been given to constitutional or
administrative law principles in the framework of international institutions, which
are of substantially more practical relevance.'29 Indeed, it seems that the effort to
introduce public law notions into the law of responsibility, and to use that as the
main vehicle for basic notions of constitutionalization, has led to the neglect of the
need to develop a wider coherent body of legal principles that applies to the control
of legality for the protection of public interest norms.
CONCLUSION
The process of constitutionalization has not left the law of international respon-
sibility untouched. In certain limited, but distinct, dimensions, we can identify con-
stitutional features of this body of law. This part of the law of responsibility is
concerned with organizational principles, legality, and public interest norms, rather
than legal injury of individuals or groups of states or international organizations.
The manner in which the Articles on State Responsibility (and now the Articles on
Responsibility of International Organizations) attempt to combine the traditional
127 ILC, supra note 10, at 255-56.
128. Id. at 261-63.
129. The notable exception is the work in the framework of the global administrative law project.
Kingsbury, supra note 27
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model based on private law analogies with public law elements is rather incoherent
and, in fact, pushes the unity to the breaking point. It still may be possible to con-
sider the present law of international responsibility as a relatively unitary body that
can fulfill two interests: the protection of rights of individual states and the preser-
vation of public order. This unity can, in part, be preserved as a result of the fact that
international courts have been able to fill, in an ad hoc manner, gaps in the private
law dimension of international responsibility. It can also be preserved as a result of
the fact that large areas of "public wrongs" are developed outside the law of respon-
sibility, particularly in the form of a rapidly developing body of international ad-
ministrative law, thereby marginalizing state responsibility.
It has been said that such practices should be brought within the law of respon-
sibility, but that seems erroneous. It may be more fruitful to look more to compara-
tive structures of domestic law, where constitutional and administrative law
principles are quite separate from tort law. As yet, this is very poorly developed in
international law. But that deficiency of international law cannot be solved by over-
burdening a body of principles of responsibility that was not and should not be de-
veloped to deal with this problem. Different problems call for different solutions.
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